**Week 7 Notes**

**Immigration Across the Disciplines**

**Internment** referred to people from other countries that were not citizens, whereas **concentration camps** are more accurate to such treatment of a country’s own citizens (US activity against Japanese Americans).

**Ngai, Chapters 5&6**

**Japanese American Internment During WWII & Citizenship Renunciation**

Again, racial differences were the key; Japanese were treated differently because the government felt it did not know how to test the loyalty of an Asian race, but it did know how to handle the Germans & Italians. (p. 176)

Searches and investigations prior to this had found Japanese Americans to be in no way associated with the wartime activities of Japan. (p. 176)

**Internment, Culture, & Loyalty**

The War Relocation Authority did not hold that all Japanese were racially prone to disloyalty, instead using a measuring system revolving around assimilation. (p. 177)

The WRA, run my New Deal liberals, felt that the camps they created could serve as centers to speed up the assimilation of Japanese and make them more profitable citizens. (p. 178-179)

Despite claims of trying to Americanize them, Japanese Americans understood that their citizenships had been effectively nullified and their rights revoked. (p. 180)

The activities within camps suggest that nationalism toward both countries coexisted, and that they internees wanted to preserve more of their ethnic/cultural history than the political aspects. (p. 180-181)

**The Loyalty Questionnaire**

Following the events at Pearl Harbor, the military ceased to induct Japanese Americans and sent those already serving away via honorary discharge. (p. 182)

Leaders of the JACL wanted to allow Japanese Americans to enlist in order to prove their loyalty. (p. 182)

A segregated unit was created in 1943, and enrollment was strictly voluntary. (p. 182)

The voluntary leave clearance did not move quickly enough, so the WRA proposed to issue the loyalty questionnaire to all internees over 17 in order to find and relocate the truly disloyal. (p. 182)

Under voluntary leave, they could relocate to regions outside the West Coast provided they had sponsorship in the form of employment or education. (p. 182)

The questionnaire questioned whether they would conform to the new cultural practices in the US and what they would do if presented with a disloyal Japanese American. (p. 183)

Many internees refused to answer yes to questions about serving in the military to renouncing Japan; this was met with various forms of coercion, including threats. (p. 184)

Note: in places like Hawai’i, where there was no internment, 10000 Japanese Americans volunteered for service; only 1200 from the mainland camps did. (p. 184)

**Renunciation of Citizenship**

Continued disorder in internment camps, especially Tule Lake, led to the Denationalization Act of 1944 (July), which allowed citizens to make voluntary renunciation of their citizenship as long as the attorney general found no cause for it to be detrimental to the US. (p. 187)

This was intended to separate truly loyal internees from disloyal, Japanese nationalists; those, like internees at Tule Lake, would renounce citizenship and thus allow themselves to be legally detained. (p. 187)

Only some of those internees that did renounce citizenship often did so out of bitterness toward the US; many did because they did not want/feel safe leaving the camps until the war was over.

Many immediately regretted not fully considering the implications of renouncing citizenship, but their requests to halt or reverse the process were denied. (p. 191-192)

Others feared forced deportation to Japan now that they were not citizens and that Japan was losing the war. (p. 192)

Eventually, thousands of Japanese that had renounced their citizenship succeeded it reversing the act via the court system. (p. 196)

Although emphasis was placed on coercion to renounce citizenship when such individuals tried to reverse the process, this was largely a construct to achieve the desired reaction by the authorities and casts the renouncers as victims with no individuality. (p. 199)

It is most likely that they shared divided loyalties that were weak in both directions; they were, above all, pragmatic. (p. 200)

**Cold War Chinese Immigration Crisis; Confession Cases**

Despite early racial segregation and exclusion within the US, the Chinese benefited from the continual tragedies that besieged their homeland, creating a noble pathos in its suffering. (p. 202)

The exclusionary laws against the Chinese were lifted in 1943 to counter Japanese propaganda, but a strict, low quota was enforced. (p. 203)

The rise of Communist China totally reversed this image and made Chinese Americans the greatest perceived threat in the US. (p. 203)

**Exclusion & Paper Sons**

In an attempt to circumvent exclusionary laws, many Chinese created false documents naming them sons of American citizens, or paper sons. (p. 204)

Those that claimed to be China-born sons of American citizens were vying for derivative citizenship. (p. 204-205)

Often, the rulings of courts ended up creating documents that supported the claims of these immigrants where none had previously existed. (p. 205)

*Jus solis*: citizenship by being born in the country

*Jus sanguis*: citizenship by ancestry

**Hong Kong & Cold War Immigration Crisis**

When US consulates in China closed and turned everything over to Hong Kong, and increasing numbers of passport applications resulted in them requiring nearly unobtainable evidence. (p. 207)

China had become the number one enemy of the US during the 1950s. (p. 208)

Beginning in late 1955, official reports began to link the Chinese immigration crisis to Communist attempts to infiltrate the US, especially the fraud used to gain access documentation. (p. 209)

Everett F. Drumright abused his position of power to circumvent the laws and deny access to hundreds of passport applicants. (p. 210)

His policies eventually became so extreme that they were almost laughable. (p. 211)

**Chinatown & Cold War Immigration Crisis**

The Justice Department carried out domestic action, targeting paper sons and charging them with fraud, perjury, & conspiracy. (p. 212)

Expanding political influence following the revocation of exclusionary laws gave Chinese some defense against the measures being taken against them. (p. 214)

Chinese family associations were targeted keenly, and relied on the protection of large cultural organizations for protection, including Six Companies. (p. 213-214)

Chinese in general refused to cooperate with investigators. (p. 216)

**INS Chinese Confession Program**

INS in San Francisco began the program in 1956, promising to help Chinese that admitted to being illegal to adjust their status if at all possible. (p. 218)

Aliens that served in the armed forces for 90 days were eligible for naturalization. (p. 218)

The program was not governed by legislation, instead operating within the scope of existing laws and amendments of the Constitution. (p. 219)

**Incarcerating Japanese Americans (Roger Daniels)**

Executive Order 9066 (allowing for the internment of Japanese Americans) was signed & issued in direct response to the events of Pearl Harbor. (p. 19)

The Issei were an immigration of immigrants, legally barred from many occupations. (p. 20)

The Nisei were the children of Issei and other Nisei and considered citizens, but underwent segregation. (p. 20)

Despite claims to the contrary, not even one case of espionage by a Japanese American was identified during the war. (p. 20)

**Further Thoughts on the Japanese American Cases (Roger Daniels)**

Issues of race and loyalty were confused by legal viewpoints. (p. 55)